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Predictive gaze cues affect face evaluations:
The effect of facial emotion
Andrew P. Bayliss, Debra Griffiths, and Steven P. Tipper
School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
When we see someone change their direction of gaze, we spontaneously follow their
eyes because we expect people to look at interesting objects. Bayliss and Tipper
(2006) examined the consequences of observing this expectancy being either
confirmed or violated by faces producing reliable or unreliable gaze cues.
Participants viewed different faces that would consistently look at the target, or
consistently look away from the target: The faces that consistently looked towards
targets were subsequently chosen as being more trustworthy than the faces that
consistently looked away from targets. The current work demonstrates that these
gaze contingency effects are only detectedwhen faces create a positive social context
by smiling, but not in the negative context when all the faces held angry or neutral
expressions. These data suggest that implicit processing of the reward contingencies
associated with gaze cues relies on a positive emotional expression to maintain
expectations of a favourable outcome of joint attention episodes.
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Responding appropriately to the social cues of other members of our social
group is critical to establishing fluent interactions with other people. For
example, if one sees someone suddenly move their eyes, the natural response
is to establish ‘‘joint attention’’, by orienting to the same object. Joint
attention has been studied heavily in developmental psychology because of
its critical role in social development (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Moore &
Dunham, 1995); however, there has been an increased interest in the
attentional mechanisms that underlie this orienting effect in adults (e.g.,
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The advantage in following each others’ gaze is because people usually
attend to objects of interest in the environment, which we might not
otherwise have become aware of in the ever-changing world. Hence, normally
developing infants benefit greatly by following gaze spontaneously from a
very young age (Scaife & Bruner, 1975), and this continues into adulthood.
Indeed, gaze cues have effects on attention even when, in cognitive
psychology paradigms, objects of interest (i.e., targets) only appear at the
gazed location 50%, or even 25% of the time (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen,
Ristic & Kingstone, 2004; Tipples, 2008). It appears therefore, in most
circumstances, attention is cued by gaze direction in an automatic fashion.
The gaze following system developed to quickly orient to the direction of
gaze because it is usually advantageous to do so. However, the very fluency
of the system makes it vulnerable to deception. A ‘‘cheater’’, knowing that
their social gaze will influence the attention of others, is able to gain an
advantage by looking away from the locus of their planned action. For
example, a skilled soccer player might look to the left, but then pass to the
right, knowing that his opponent, despite often being comparably skilled,
will anticipate a leftward pass. Magicians frequently use misdirection by
using social cues in performances to remarkable effect (see Kuhn & Land,
2006). In both cases, the observer knows that deception is likely, but is
unable to prevent being tricked.
People are nevertheless highly sensitive to the perceived trustworthiness of
the people they meet. For example, manipulating the temporal dynamics of a
smile can influence trustworthiness ratings of faces such that ‘‘fake’’ smiles
cause reductions in perceived trustworthiness, despite other physical aspects
of the smiles being kept constant (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Winston,
Strange, O’Doherty, and Dolan (2002) showed that amygdala activation in
response to a face is predicted by the trustworthiness of that face, even in a
passive viewing task (see also Todorov, Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby, 2007).
Similar effects have been shown in studies where trustworthiness is an
attribute that is acquired via an experimental manipulation, rather than as
an extant property of the face (e.g., Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith,
2004), where faces paired with uncooperative behaviour in economic
exchange games are trusted less, and activate the amygdala more strongly
than faces paired with cooperative behaviour.
Rather than using the outcomes of economic games to predict acquired
trustworthiness, Bayliss and Tipper (2006) employed a gaze cueing paradigm
using faces that behaved differently throughout the experiment. The
participants were told that the faces would look towards and away from
the targets with equal frequency. In fact, whenever certain faces appeared,
they would always look at the target. Hence, these reliable faces helped
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attention to the target, thereby reducing reaction time. Furthermore, these
faces also held to the social expectancy that people tend to look at objects of
interest or importance. In contrast, intermixed with these faces, other
identities always looked at the opposite location to where the target would
appear. These counterpredictive faces hindered the participant, as they were
consistently deceptive in their behaviour. Bayliss and Tipper found that the
gaze direction of these predictive and counterpredictive faces produced
identical cueing effects to a third set of faces that looked towards targets on
50% of trials, which is the standard proportion in such experiments. These
cueing effects are somewhat surprising, as they suggest that the gaze cueing
system appears to be insensitive to contingencies related to the reliability of
the social cues produced by different people, and cannot modify the strength
of the attention shift based on prior encounters (but see Deaner, Shepherd,
& Platt, 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2006, for evidence that gaze cueing can be
influenced by person identity in some circumstances).
After the completion of the gaze cueing segment of the study, Bayliss and
Tipper (2006) then presented participants with pairs of these faces and asked
them to choose the most trustworthy face. Although participants were still
unaware that one face from each pair had looked at the targets, and the
other always looked away from the targets, participants chose the reliable
‘‘helpful’’ faces significantly more often than the ‘‘deceptive’’ faces. There
was also evidence that the ‘‘deceptive’’ faces were better encoded in memory
in their paradigm, since participants tended to feel that they had
encountered these ‘‘deceptive’’ faces more often during the experiment
than the ‘‘helpful’’ faces. This notion converges with evidence of enhanced
memory for untrustworthy faces (Yamagishi, Tanida, Mashima, Shimoma,
& Kanazawa, 2003). Interestingly, participants rarely noticed the gaze cueing
contingencies of the faces, supporting the idea that these effects emerge
through unconscious processes. It therefore appears that while gaze cueing
itself cannot be calibrated to account for the likely reliability (or otherwise)
of the social cues given by a known individual, the contingencies are
nevertheless encoded and are able to affect subsequent evaluative judge-
ments of the faces.
This study aims to replicate and extend the findings of Bayliss and Tipper
(2006) by investigating the effect of facial emotion on the ability to detect
deceptive individuals from gaze shift behaviour. In this experiment, the faces
expressed different facial emotions to three separate groups of participants.
Hence, each group of participants saw either happy, angry, or neutral facial
expressions. There are two main motivations for this manipulation. The first
is empirical: We intend to confirm and replicate the findings of Bayliss and
Tipper. Investigating the effect further while controlling for and manipulat-
ing facial emotion has the potential of identifying important boundary
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1 The second is theoretical: How
efficient are we at picking up on the subtleties of social interactions in
markedly different social contexts? Is the behaviour of others encoded in a
similar way when every individual we encounter is in a positive state or
negative emotional state? If this is the case, then we predict that the emotion
of the faces producing gaze cues will have no effect on the strength to which
the cue contingencies affect participants’ judgements of the faces.
On the other hand, facial emotion may have a critical role. When
someone smiles at you, a positive outcome to the social exchange is expected,
whereas this is not expected when someone looks at you with an angry or
neutral emotional expression. Might this shift in expectancy in these
situations impact the way that social contingencies are picked up on in
this paradigm? Indeed, the idea that learning is potentiated in situations
where expectations are violated lends support to this hypothesis (Kamin,
1969; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). That is, when a happy face violates the rule
of looking at interesting objects, this will have a stronger impact on the
system than when an angry face behaves in the same way. Hence, we predict
stronger effects of gaze contingencies when the face is happy than when
angry. An additional condition where neutral faces were used was included
in the design, and the clear expectation is that the magnitude of the effects
will fall in between those of the happy and angry conditions. That is, the
positivity of the emotional expression will share a linear relationship with
the measures of implicit learning of gaze cue contingencies.
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-two adults (20 males, 52 females), with a mean age of 20.3 years
(SD2.9 years) participated in the experiment in return for course credit or
payment. All were naı ¨ve as to the purpose of the experiment in general, and
therefore naı ¨ve to the predictive nature of the faces’ gaze cues. Informed
consent was gained, and participants received course credit for their
participation.
1 The faces used in the original Bayliss and Tipper (2006) study were collected from various
sources, and as such the photographs were rather heterogeneous in their composition. However, it
is possible that the positive emotional expression on the majority of the faces used in the original
study may have potentiated the effects on trustworthiness and memory.
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Twenty unfamiliar faces were taken from a larger sample of 36 faces from the
NimStim face database. These faces were arranged into pairs such that one
face from each of the pairs belonged to Face Group A (n10), and the other
to Face Group B (n10). The selection of the pairs was initially based on
the ‘‘neutral expression’’ versions of the face stimuli. Each pair was matched
for gender, ethnicity, and approximate age. Independent raters (n12) also
ensured that the pairs of faces were rated equal attractiveness and
trustworthiness, and that, as a whole, both groups of faces (A and B) were
of approximately equal attractiveness and trustworthiness. There were two
pairs of Black females, two pairs of Black males, three pairs of White
females, and three pairs of White males. Examples of each face holding three
emotional expressions, ‘‘happy’’, ‘‘neutral’’, and ‘‘angry’’, were used. The
eyes in the original stimuli were staring straight ahead. These stimuli were
manipulated to produce two further versions of each face, with eyes looking
to the left, and to the right. Hence there were a total of 180 face stimuli (20
identities3 emotions3 gaze directions). The faces measured approxi-
mately 10.610.0 cm. The eye region measured between 4.0 and 4.5 cm
between the left corner of the left eye and the right corner of the right eye.
The eyes themselves measured approximately 0.51.0 cm, with pupils/irises
measuring approximately 0.50.5 cm.
Pictures of 36 household objects were used as target stimuli. Eighteen of
these were categorised as belonging in the kitchen, and 18 were garage items.
These could appear in one of four colours (red, green, blue, and yellow), and
could appear flipped about the vertical axis (so that, for example, a kettle
could appear with the handle on the left, or on the right). Targets varied 1.5
5.0 cm3.08.0 cm, andwere presented such that their centre was 10.0 cm to
theleftorrightofthecentreofthescreen.Ablackfixationcrosswasalsoused,
measuring 0.70.7 cm, placed at the centre of the screen. The stimuli were
presented on a monitor placed approximately 60 cm from the participant.
Design
The factor ‘‘emotional expression’’ was manipulated between subjects, with
participants split equally into groups of participants observing happy,
neutral, or angry faces. The factor, ‘‘congruency’’ was manipulated within
subjects.Theeyesofthefacecouldeitherlooktowards(‘‘congruent’’)oraway
from (‘‘incongruent’’) the target. For half the participants, the faces from
Group A looked at the target consistently, whereas the faces from Group B
consistentlylookedawayfromthetarget.Thefacespresentedtotheotherhalf
of the participants had the opposite condition assignment (Face Group A
1076 BAYLISS, GRIFFITHS, TIPPERlooked away from, and Face Group B looked towards targets). With this
procedure, the effect of any residual a priori differences between the
trustworthiness and attractiveness of the pairs of faces was minimised.
Procedure
Gaze cueing. Participants were seated in front of the computer screen,
with their heads placed on a chinrest. They were instructed to fixate the
centre of the screen throughout each trial, and, while ignoring the ostensibly
nonpredictive direction of gaze, to respond to the target as quickly and
accurately as possible. Participants responded to ‘‘kitchen’’ items with the
spacebar, and to ‘‘garage’’ items with the ‘‘h’’ key, using the thumb and first
finger of their right hand, respectively. On each trial, a fixation cross
appeared in the centre of the screen for 600 ms. This was followed by one of
the 20 faces, staring straight ahead for 1500 ms. Then, 500 ms before the
onset of the target, the eyes would move to the left or the right. Depending
on whether the face was from the congruent or incongruent set of faces for a
given participant, the target would then appear to the left or right of the
screen. Half of the targets would be ‘‘garage’’, and half ‘‘kitchen’’ items,
although the exact identity, colour, and orientation of the target were
selected randomly without replacement on each trial. At response (or after
2500 ms, whichever was sooner), the display cleared and a feedback tone
sounded (bell or buzzer for correct or incorrect, respectively). This blank
screen remained for 1500 ms before the next trial began (see Figure 1).
After completing 12 practice trials, in which a single face from a separate
set would look at, and away from the target an equal number of times,
participants completed a total of 240 trials, split over two blocks of 120.
Hence, each face appeared 12 times over the course of the session. Which
face was presented on each trial was selected randomly.
Face evaluations. Directly after the gaze cueing procedure, the partici-
pants completed three runs through a two-alternative forced choice
procedure in which they were shown displays of the ten pairs of faces (i.e.,
one from Group A, and one from Group B). These were presented next to
each other (to the left and right of fixation). The order of the pairs was
randomised, as was the leftright positioning of each face within the pairs.
For each face pair, participants were asked to choose which face they felt was
the most trustworthy of the pair. They made this response by hitting ‘‘1’’ on
the keypad if they felt the face on the left was most trustworthy, and ‘‘2’’ if
the face on the right was the most trustworthy of the pair. A blank screen
was presented after each response for 2000 ms.
After choosing the most trustworthy face from each of the 10 pairs,
participants completed the questionnaire a second time (face pair order and
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some faces might have appeared in the experiment more often than others
(in fact, they had all appeared 12 times). Hence, they were asked to choose
from each pair the face they felt had been presented more often during the
gaze cueing experiment.
Next, participants were debriefed fully. This involved asking whether they
had noticed the fact that some faces had acted differently to others. No
subject noticed anything close to the true experimental manipulation. Then,
they were told about the differing contingencies of the two sets of faces. It
was ensured that each participant understood the manipulation fully. That
is, that each of the face pairs they viewed, one face had always looked at the
target, and that the other face always looked away from the target.
Manipulation check. Although participants were unable to explicitly
recall the gaze contingencies to which they had been exposed, it was
important to examine this in a more formal test. Hence participants were
then asked to repeat the questionnaire a final time, but this time, they were
Figure 1. (A) Examples of a ‘‘congruent’’ and an ‘‘incongruent’’ gaze cue trial. (B) Examples of
face pairs for each emotion condition. The stimuli were presented in colour. Contact the authors
for a colour version of this ﬁgure, or view the online version of the journal.
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consistently looked at the target throughout the gaze cueing experiment.
Participants were indeed at chance at this task, correctly identifying the
congruently cueing faces on only 49.6% of trials, t(71)0.23, p.8,
(50.4%, 52.5%, and 45.8% for happy, neutral, and angry groups, respectively,
all nonsignificant). Hence, we can be confident that any effects of gaze
contingency on the central measures described in this report are not due to
the implementation of conscious strategies on the part of the participants:
They clearly had no conscious awareness of the gaze cue contingencies.
RESULTS
Gaze cueing
Target categorisation errors were made on 6.4% of incongruent and 5.9% of
congruent trials. A mixed-factor ANOVAwith ‘‘cueing’’ as a within-subjects
factor (congruent vs. incongruent) and ‘‘emotion’’ as a between-subjects
factor (happy, neutral, and angry) revealed no significant effects, all FsB1.6,
ps .2. Along with trials with erroneous responses, trials with RTs 1500
ms (2.5%) were removed prior to analysis of mean RT. A similar analysis to
that performed on errors was conducted, revealing a significant main effect
of cueing, F(1, 69)21.5, MSE290, pB.001, hp
2.24 because RTs were
quicker to targets appearing in congruently cued locations (719 ms) than
targets appearing at incongruently cued locations (733 ms). The remaining
main effect and interaction were both nonsignificant (FsB1). Nevertheless,
t-tests were performed on the RT data for each group to ensure each emotion
elicited gaze cueing reliably. Significant gaze cueing was observed in the
happy face group, t(23)2.87, p.009, d0.59, where congruent (699 ms)
were faster than incongruently cued targets (715 ms); the neutral face group,
t(23)2.94, p.007, d0.60, congruent (722 ms) faster than incongruent
targets (735 ms); and finally, the angry faces, t(23)2.24, p.035, d0.46,
congruent (737 ms) faster than to incongruent targets (748 ms).
Facial evaluations
When asked to choosewhich wasthe most trustworthy from betweenapairof
faces, participants chose the face that had consistently looked at the target
throughout the gaze cueing experiment an average of 5.56 times out of 10
pairs of faces (see Figure 2). A one-sample t-test demonstrated that this
tendency wasabovechance,t(71)3.38,p.001,one-tailed,d0.40.Onthe
second run through the forced-choice procedure, participants were requested
to choose the face that they felt they had seen more often during the gaze
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more often than the other. Here, participants chose the face that had
consistentlygazed tothetargetanaverageof4.71times outof10pairs.Aone-
sample t-test demonstrated that this face frequency responsewas significantly
below chance (i.e., 5 out of 10 pairs), t(71)1.71, p.045, one-tailed, d
0.20. That is, participants more often felt that the incongruently gazing faces
had appeared more often during the gaze cueing experiment.
These data essentially replicate and confirm those of Bayliss and Tipper
(2006). When faces are seen to consistently predict the location of a visual
target by always looking towards it they are evaluated as being more
trustworthy in comparison to faces that consistently deceive the participants
by looking away from the target. Importantly, the participants chose these
‘‘helpful’’ faces significantly less often in the second task, where they were
considering frequency of exposure by choosing the face they felt had
appeared more often.
The effect of facial emotion
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, we hypothesised that a positive
emotion expressed by the faces in this experiment will potentiate the effects
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Figure 2. Mean number of ‘‘congruent’’ faces chosen for each measure, for each experiment. The
y-axis is intersected around chance (5/10). Error bars represent standard error of the
mean. Asterisks indicate p-values derived from one-sample t-test contrasts; ***pB.001, *pB.05,
pB.10.
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a face increases in positive valence, the ratings of trustworthiness and
frequency of exposure will diverge from chance; that the proportion of
congruent gazing faces chosen as more trustworthy will increase, but fewer
will be chosen as having appeared more often in the experiment than the
counterpredictive faces. Hence, a MeasureEmotion ANOVA was per-
formed, followed by planned contrasts for each measure, testing for
differences between the happy, angry, and neutral groups. This ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of measure, F(1, 69)13.1, MSE1.97, p
.001, hp
2.16. This demonstrates again that responses on the two measures
deviate from each other since fewer predictive-valid faces were chosen in the
frequency measure as compared with the trustworthiness measure. The main
effect of emotion was not significant, F(1, 69)B1. The critical Measure
Emotion interaction was marginal, F(1, 69)2.93, MSE1.97, p.06,
hp
2.078. The planned contrasts revealed that this trend was due to the
participants in the happy group showing a significantly stronger effect of
trustworthiness than participants viewing angry faces, p.05, one-tailed,
and a trend for a stronger frequency effect, p.055, one-tailed. No other
contrasts approached significance.
To confirm the effects of face emotion on the gaze cueing contingency
effect on trust and face frequency, separate analysis of each emotion group
was undertaken (see Figure 2). As expected, the effect for trust, t(23)4.61,
pB.001, d0.94, and frequency of presentation, t(23)2.10, p.047,
d0.43, were significant when faces smiled. However, for the neutral faces
the trust effect was marginal, t1.81, p.083, d0.37, and there was no
significant appearance frequency effect, t(23)0.50, ns. Finally for the
faces expressing anger there were no significant effects, ts(23)0.71 and
0.15, ns.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study aimed to confirm and extend the results of Bayliss and Tipper
(2006), which showed that faces that reliably looked at targets were
subsequently judged to be more trustworthy than faces that looked away
from targets. These gaze cue contingencies also had effects on memory:
Episodes with deceptive faces appeared to be better encoded in memory
leading to increased familiarity with these faces. In the current study, stimuli
that were additionally controlled for emotional expression were used. The
central findings were that the effects on social judgements and memory were
only reliably replicated when the faces used were smiling. Despite the fact
that angry and neutral faces produced reliable gaze cueing effects, the
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affect its perceived trustworthiness.
In addition to the replication of the effects on trustworthiness and
frequency measures of face memory, we felt it important to investigate the
possibility that the effects were due in part to explicit memory of the gaze
contingencies associated with the different faces. Participants did not report
that they had noticed that some faces were looking at the target each time
they appeared, and others always looked away, so a more formal measure
was employed. Interestingly, after being informed of the gaze contingencies
participants were completely unable to correctly identify the faces that had
reliably indicated the target location. This suggests that where the effect does
emerge, it might not be due to conscious processing of the observed social
behaviour of the faces. Furthermore, in contrast to Bayliss and Tipper
(2006), we did not use any ‘‘filler’’ faces with random gaze target
contingencies. Hence, even where all faces were consistent in their behaviour,
participants still failed to notice the experimental manipulation.
Of central importance, the magnitude of the effects of gaze contingencies
on the trustworthiness and memory measures did appear to be linearly
related to the valence of the facial emotion. That is, the effects of gaze
contingencies increased as the emotional expression of the faces became
more positive (see Figure 2). This suggests that these effects are indeed
modulated by emotional expression, rather than any lower level structural
features of the stimuli used. This may be because when we encounter angry
faces, the expectation of a positive social exchange is quite low, so when this
weak expectation is violated by the eyes of the face looking away from the
target, little impact is made on the cognitive system and hence only a weak
link between the facial identity of the angry face and its behaviour is
possible. The converse is true with a happy face where we have a high
expectation of a positive outcome, and hence a stronger impact, in terms of
learning, is made when this social expectation is violated (Kamin, 1969;
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
A further interpretation of our results can be made from a mood
induction perspective. Bolte, Goschke, and Kuhl (2003) found that
participants’ ability to discriminate sets of associated words from sets of
unassociated words was significantly better following the induction of a
positive mood as compared with a negative mood induction procedure and
baseline. Importantly, participants were no more able to consciously solve
these word-based problems, suggesting that these effects emerged through
processes that are implicit and affected by emotional context. This is related
to our finding since if being exposed to happy faces improves mood, then
according to Bolte et al. this could promote ‘‘the activation of widespread
associative networks’’ (p. 420). Such activation would potentially facilitate
connections between the observed social behaviour of individuals and the
1082 BAYLISS, GRIFFITHS, TIPPERrepresentation of their facial identity, thus boosting the effect on trust-
worthiness and memory observed here in the happy group of participants.
Finally, we have to acknowledge memory processes that might mediate
the effect. For example, it is possible that the gaze target contingencies are
better encoded when faces are smiling because when the negative outcome
occurs, as in the case of an incongruent gaze cue, the impact on the
evaluation of that face would be greater as it mismatches with the positive
smiling context. Furthermore, given that long-term memory appears to be
better for positive emotional faces (Shimamura, Ross, & Bennett, 2006), the
effect of prior gaze contingencies leaves a stronger trace in memory when the
face is smiling, influencing later assessments of individuals for trust. Of
course all these concepts, learning via expectancy violation, mood-modu-
lated association generation and memory for emotional faces are all
intertwined and are all likely to have an impact in the present paradigm
and contribute to the impact of facial emotion on the effects we describe.
In conclusion, participants in this study were unable to prevent their
attention orienting in the direction of another person’s gaze, even when it
was consistently deceptive about the location of a target. This is perhaps
because the neural networks responsible for gaze perception and identity
processing are separate, and hence interactions between gaze and identity
may only emerge later in the processing stream (e.g., Andrews & Ewbank,
2004; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). Subtle interactions between gaze direction
and person identity nevertheless do indeed take place, influencing judge-
ments of trust, but at a level not available for conscious report. That gaze
cueing contingencies influence judgements of trust again demonstrate the
sophistication of social evaluative systems, and their ability to guide decision
making in the social environment. Although we might not be able to prevent
orienting in the direction in which a known deceiver is looking, the
deception is at least encoded, and this information can aid the guidance
of other, more complex social interactions with such individuals.
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